

1023 MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE

In (treating) (diagnosing) (plaintiff)'s (injuries) (condition), (doctor) was required to use the degree of care, skill, and judgment which reasonable (doctors who are in general practice) (specialists who practice the specialty which (doctor) practices) would exercise in the same or similar circumstances, having due regard for the state of medical science at the time (plaintiff) was (treated) (diagnosed). A doctor who fails to conform to this standard is negligent. The burden is on (plaintiff) to prove that (doctor) was negligent.

A doctor is not negligent, however, for failing to use the highest degree of care, skill, and judgment or solely because a bad result may have followed (his) (her) (care and treatment) (surgical procedure) (diagnosis). The standard you must apply in determining if (doctor) was negligent is whether (doctor) failed to use the degree of care, skill, and judgment that reasonable (general practitioners) (specialists) would exercise given the state of medical knowledge at the time of the (treatment) (diagnosis) in issue.

[Use this paragraph only if there is evidence of two or more alternative methods of treatment or diagnosis recognized as reasonable: If you find from the evidence that more than one method of (treatment for) (diagnosing) (plaintiff)'s (injuries) (condition) was recognized as reasonable given the state of medical knowledge at that time, then (doctor) was at liberty to select any of the recognized methods. (Doctor) was not negligent because (he) (she) chose to use one of these recognized (treatment) (diagnostic) methods

rather than another recognized method if (he) (she) used reasonable care, skill, and judgment in administering the method.]

You have heard testimony during this trial from doctors who have testified as expert witnesses. The reason for this is because the degree of care, skill, and judgment that a reasonable doctor would exercise is not a matter within the common knowledge of laypersons. This standard is within the special knowledge of experts in the field of medicine and can only be established by the testimony of experts. You, therefore, may not speculate or guess what the standard of care, skill, and judgment is in deciding this case but rather must attempt to determine it from the expert testimony that you heard during this trial. In determining the weight to be given an opinion, you should consider the qualifications and credibility of the expert and whether reasons for the opinion are based on facts in the case. You are not bound by any expert's opinion.

(Insert the appropriate cause instruction. To avoid duplication, JI-1500 should not be given if the following two bracketed paragraphs are used.)

[The cause question asks whether there was a causal connection between negligence on the part of (doctor) and (plaintiff)'s (injury) (condition). A person's negligence is a cause of a plaintiff's (injury) (condition) if the negligence was a substantial factor in producing the present condition of the plaintiff's health. This question does not ask about "the cause" but rather "a cause." The reason for this is that there can be more than one cause of (an injury) (a condition). The negligence of one (or more) person(s) can cause (an

injury) (a condition) or (an injury) (a condition) can be the result of the natural progression of (the injury) (the condition). In addition, the (injury) (condition) can be caused jointly by a person's negligence and also the natural progression of the (injury) (condition).]

[If you conclude from the evidence that the present condition of (plaintiff)'s health was caused jointly by (doctor)'s negligence and also the natural progression of (plaintiff)'s (injury) (condition), then you should find that the (doctor)'s negligence was a cause of the (plaintiff)'s present condition of health.]

[The evidence indicates without dispute that when (plaintiff) retained the services of (doctor) and placed (himself) (herself) under (doctor)'s care, (plaintiff) was suffering from some (disability resulting from injuries sustained in an accident) (illness or disease). (Plaintiff)'s then physical condition cannot be regarded by you in any way as having been caused or contributed to by any negligence on the part of (doctor). This question asks you to determine whether the condition of (plaintiff)'s health, as it was when (plaintiff) placed (himself) (herself) under the doctor's care, has been aggravated or further impaired as a natural result of the negligence of (doctor)'s (treatment) (diagnosis).]

(Insert appropriate damage instructions.)

[(Plaintiff) sustained injuries before the (treatment) (diagnosis) by (doctor). Such injuries have caused (and could in the future cause) (plaintiff) to endure pain and suffering and incur some disability. In answering these questions on damages, you will entirely exclude from your consideration all damages which resulted from the original injury; you

will consider only the damages (plaintiff) sustained as a result of the (treatment) (diagnosis) of by (doctor).]

[It will, therefore, be necessary for you to distinguish and separate, first, the natural results in damages that flow from (plaintiff)’s original (illness) (injuries) and, second, those that flow from (doctor)’s (treatment) (diagnosis) and allow (plaintiff) only the damages that naturally resulted from the (treatment) (diagnosis) by (doctor).]

COMMENT

This instruction was approved by the Committee in 1963. It was revised in 1966, 1974, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2009, 2011, and 2012. The comment was updated in 1990, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2016, 2017, 2019, and 2021. The 2009 revision added “(diagnosis)” throughout the instruction to the alleged negligence. This revision was approved by the Committee in October 2021; it added to the comment.

The Committee recommends that the basic inquiry with respect to the defendant’s conduct be framed in simple terms of negligence. Failure on the part of the doctor to conform to the applicable standard of care constitutes negligence. This form of submission is preferable to the form previously employed, i.e., stating the duty in the question. The statement of the duty is the function of the instruction. The Committee recommends that the general negligence instruction, JI-Civil 1005, not be used in addition to this instruction.

There are a series of concepts involved in the instruction. The duty of the doctor in his or her care, treatment, and procedures; the effects of bad results on liability; the degree of care, skill, and judgment required to satisfy his or her duty; the duty allows a choice of accepted alternative methods of treatment; the doctor’s liability cannot be predicated on other than expert testimony (except in a res ipsa case); and the issue is not on the judgment the doctor made but on the degree and skill he or she exercised in arriving at the judgment. The Committee concluded that foreseeability of injury or harm is inherent in the standard expressed in the first paragraph, and if an issue in the case, it must be addressed by expert testimony.

If the trial judge prefers, this instruction can be divided into its components (i.e., negligence, cause, alternative care, damages, etc.) when instructing the jury and when providing the jury with written instructions during its deliberations.

Standard of Care. This instruction reflects the changes recommended by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Nowatske v. Osterloh, 198 Wis.2d 419, 543 N.W.2d 25 (1996). The former version of this instruction was based on prevailing case law which measured ordinary care based on what an “average”

physician would have done. The court in Nowatske said “the standard of care applicable to physicians in Wisconsin can not be conclusively established either by a reflection of what the majority of practitioners do or by a sum of the customs which those practitioners follow.” Instead, the court said “it must be established by a determination of what it is reasonable to expect of a professional given the state of medical knowledge at the time of the treatment.” Nowatske, *supra*, at 438-39. See also the comment to Wis JI-Civil 1005.

Standard of Care: Unlicensed First-Year Resident. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2005 WI 85, 282 Wis.2d 69, 698 N.W.2d 643, has held that unlicensed first-year residents should be held to:

the standard of care applicable to an unlicensed first-year resident . . . Although we anticipate this new standard of care to be lower than that of an average licensed physician in some cases, we do not expect that it will become a grant of immunity. After all, unlicensed first-year residents are graduates of a medical school who provide sophisticated health care services appropriate to their “in training” status. Therefore, unlicensed residents could still be found negligent if, for example, they undertook to treat outside the scope of their authority and expertise, or they failed to consult with someone more skilled and experienced when the standard of care required it.

The court characterized the status of an unlicensed first-year resident as “unique.” It said the resident’s authority was limited:

Although [resident] could refer to himself as an “M.D.,” his freedom of action was more restricted than that of a licensed physician. Indeed, the circuit court found that Dr. Lindemann “had no authority or privileges to provide primary obstetrical care,” and “was not supposed to act as the primary attending physician.” Rather, “[h]is primary duty was to assess and report findings and differential diagnoses to an upper level senior resident or to the attending obstetrician.”

Effect of Bad Results. The second paragraph states the rule as to the effects of bad results on the doctor’s liability. Bad results raise no presumption of negligence. DeBruine v. Voskuil, 168 Wis. 104, 169 N.W. 288 (1918); Ewing v. Goode, 78 F. 442 (S.D. Ohio 1897); Wurdemann v. Barnes, 92 Wis. 206, 66 N.W. 111 (1896); Francois v. Mokrohisky, *supra*; Finke v. Hess, 170 Wis. 149, 174 N.W. 466 (1920); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis.2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1976). See also Nowatske v. Osterloh, *supra*.

The judgment of a doctor in his or her care, treatment, and procedures, whether good, bad, honest or mistaken, is not at issue on his or her liability. The issue raised is whether in making the judgment, he or she exercised that degree of care and skill imposed on him or her. If he or she failed to meet that standard, he or she was negligent and liable. Christianson v. Downs, *supra*; Hoven v. Kelble, *supra*; Carson v. Beloit, 32 Wis.2d 282, 145 N.W.2d 112 (1966); Wurdemann v. Barnes, *supra*; Jaeger v. Stratton, 170 Wis. 579, 176 N.W. 61 (1920).

“Not omniscience, but due care, diligence, judgment, and skill are required of physicians. When they meet such test, they are not liable for results or errors in judgment.” Jaeger v. Stratton, *supra*.

“The question . . . is not whether a physician has made a mistake; rather, the question is whether he was negligent.” Francois v. Mokrohisky, *supra*.

“The law . . . recognizes the medical profession for what it is: a class of fallible men, some of whom are unusually well qualified and expert, and some of whom are not. The standard to which they must conform is determined by the practices of neither the very best nor the worst of the class.” Francois v. Mokrohisky, *supra*.

In 1988, the court in Schuster v. Altenberg, *supra*, reaffirmed the concept that liability will not be imposed under this negligence standard for mere errors in judgment. It quoted from its earlier holdings:

The law governing this case is well settled. A doctor is not an insurer or guarantor of the correctness of his diagnosis; the requirement is that he use proper care and skill. Knief v. Sargent, 40 Wis.2d 4, 8, 161 N.W.2d 232 (1968). The question is not whether the physician made a mistake in diagnosis, but rather whether he failed to conform to the accepted standard of care. Francois v. Mokrohisky, 67 Wis.2d 196, 201, 226 N.W.2d 470 (1975). Christianson v. Downs, 90 Wis.2d 332, 338, 279 N.W.2d 918 (1979).

The second paragraph also deals with the extent and quality of the doctor’s treatment required to satisfy his or her duty. A doctor is not required to exercise the highest degree of care, skill, and judgment. Hrubes v. Faber, 163 Wis. 89, 157 N.W. 519 (1916); DeBruine v. Voskuil, *supra*; Jaeger v. Stratton, *supra*; Trogun v. Fruchtmann, *supra*; Christianson v. Downs, *supra*; Carson v. Beloit, *supra*; Francois v. Mokrohisky, *supra*; Hoven v. Kelble, *supra*.

Alternative Methods. It is appropriate to instruct the jury using the bracketed language at the bottom of page one when there is evidence that more than one method of treatment or diagnosis is recognized as reasonable. See Nowatske v. Osterloh, *supra*, at 448. This is true even if an alternative method is not actually employed, as long as the treatment utilized is not the equivalent of “doing nothing.” See Barney v. Mickelson, 2020 WI 40, ¶31, 391 Wis.2d 212, 942 N.W.2d 891. (In Barney, there was substantial testimony that the continued use of an external monitor was a reasonable method to continue to assess the patient’s heart rate and was within the standard of care, even if accepted alternatives were available and could have been utilized). It is inappropriate, however, to give this instruction where the alleged negligence “lies in failing to do something, not in negligently choosing between courses of actions.” Miller v. Kim, 191 Wis. 2d 187, 198, 528 N.W.2d 72 (1995). (The circuit court in Miller committed prejudicial error when it gave the alternative methods instruction because experts unanimously testified that a spinal tap is the only reasonable method of diagnosis for a young child with symptoms of spinal meningitis). The reasonable pursuit of an accepted alternative method does not establish a doctor’s liability, even if experts disagree on the method used. A physician is required by statute to inform a patient about the availability of all alternate, viable medical treatments and the benefits and risks of these treatments, Wis. Stat. § 448.30. For claims based on a failure by a physician to adequately inform a patient, see Wis JI-Civil 1023.2 Malpractice: Informed Consent.

Unnecessary and improper treatment constitutes medical malpractice. Northwest Gen. Hosp. v. Yee, 115 Wis.2d 59, 61-62, 339 N.W.2d 583 (1983).

Expert Testimony. Expert testimony is needed to support a finding of negligence on the part of the doctor. Kuehnemann v. Boyd, 193 Wis. 588, 214 N.W. 326 (1927); Holton v. Burton, *supra*; Lindloff v. Ross, 208 Wis. 482, 243 N.W. 403 (1932); Ahola v. Sincok, 6 Wis.2d 332, 94 N.W.2d 566 (1959); Froh

v. Milwaukee Medical Clinic, S.C., 85 Wis.2d 308, 270 N.W.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1978); McManus v. Donlin, 23 Wis.2d 289, 127 N.W.2d 22 (1964); Treptau v. Behrens Spa, Inc., *supra*.

The degree of care and skill (of a physician) can only be proved by the testimony of experts. Without such testimony, the jury has no standard which enables it to determine whether the defendant failed to exercise the degree of care and skill required of him or her. Kuehnemann v. Boyd, *supra*; Holton v. Burton, *supra*; Lindloff v. Ross, *supra*. In 2011, the Committee added language which instructs the jury that in determining the weight of an expert's testimony, it should consider the qualifications and credibility of the expert and whether the reasons for the opinion are based on facts in the case. The jury is further instructed that it is not bound by any expert's opinion. See Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67 (Paragraph 73), 341 Wis.2d 668, 816 N.W.2d 191.

For a discussion of the admissibility of expert evidence in a medical negligence case, see Seifert v. Balink, 2017 WI 2, 372 Wis.2d 525, 888 N.W.2d 816.

The general instruction on expert testimony, Wis JI-Civil 260, should be used for issues in the trial other than standard of care.

Causation. The court in Young v. Professionals Ins. Co., 154 Wis.2d 742, 454 N.W.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1990), was critical of an earlier version of JI-1023 relating to cause. The present instruction concerning situations when there is evidence of both negligence and a condition of health resulting from the natural progression of a disease (injury) correctly states that a doctor's negligence may be causal, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff's present condition of health may in part be the result of the natural progression of plaintiff's disease (injury). This is because Wisconsin has long adopted the "substantial factor test" in deciding causation questions and no longer requires that the negligence be the sole or proximate cause. Matuschka v. Murphy, 173 Wis. 484, 180 N.W. 821 (1921), has been overruled because it is "likely to misstate the law of causation." See Young, *supra*, at 749.

This instruction comports with the supreme court's decision in Fischer v. Ganju, 168 Wis.2d 834, 485 N.W.2d 10 (1992). In Fischer, the supreme court stated that a paragraph from a prior version JI-1023 (1989) was "less than completely accurate." The version given by the trial judge in Fischer in January 1990 was based on the 1989 version of this instruction which was published in April of 1989. This version was revised by the committee following the decision in Young v. Professionals Ins. Co., *supra*. The revised JI- 1023 was published in May of 1991 as part of the 1991 supplement. This revision (1991) changed the language of the prior version dealing with causation. It has not been revised since the 1991 supplement. The Committee has closely compared this present version of Wis JI-Civil 1023 to the court's criticism of the 1989 version of the instruction. The Committee concludes that the causation language of the present instruction is consistent with the discussion of causation in the Fischer decision and accurately states the law of causation in medical malpractice pre-existing condition cases.

Specialists. See Johnson v. Agoncillo, 183 Wis.2d 143, 515 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1994), where the First District Court of Appeals held that under current Wisconsin law, a doctor who practices one medical specialty is not held to the standard of care of another medical specialty, even when treating a patient in that latter specialty. Dr. Agoncillo was a family practitioner treating a high-risk obstetrical patient. Plaintiff Johnson requested an instruction that would hold Agoncillo to the standard of the "average physician who

treats high risk obstetrical patients. . . .” The trial judge refused to give such an instruction and the court of appeals affirmed, stating:

Thus, that Dr. Agoncillo chose to care for and treat Ms. Johnson during her high-risk pregnancy did not transform his class of physician to that of those who treat high-risk obstetrical patients; he was and he remained a general family practitioner who treated obstetrical patients and, as instructed by the trial court, he was thus ‘required to use the degree of care, skill, and judgment which is usually exercised in the same or similar circumstances’ by the average physician in that class.

The court went on to say, however, that the physician who attempts to treat a patient outside her or his expertise is not, thereby, immunized from liability. Referring to a cardiologist who treats a cancer patient, the court said in Johnson at 152:

If competent evidence establishes that the average cardiologist would either refer the cancer patient to an oncologist or would consult with an oncologist, the cardiologist could be found negligent for not referring or consulting.

Captain of Ship Doctrine. In a recent decision, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action argued that the surgeon should be held vicariously liable for the negligence of two hospital nurses from a county-owned hospital who were responsible for counting sponges. Lewis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 60, 243 Wis.2d 648, 627 N.W.2d 484. The hospital was county-owned and, therefore, its liability at the time was limited to \$50,000.

The trial court, on summary judgment, agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that, as a matter of law, the surgeon is the “captain of the ship” and is responsible for the actions of the parties that were in the operating room. Interestingly, the plaintiff did not argue that the surgeon was vicariously liable for the nurses’ actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Both the court of appeals and supreme court rejected the adoption of the captain of the ship doctrine to impose liability on the doctor. The supreme court said the “captain of the ship doctrine” has lost its vitality across the country as plaintiffs have been able to sustain actions against full-care modern hospitals for the negligence of their employees.

Psychiatric Malpractice Claims. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized in Schuster v. Altenberg, *supra*, that a psychiatrist may be negligent by:

1. negligent diagnosing and treating, including failing to warn of side effects of medication,
2. failing to warn a patient’s family of the patient’s condition and its dangerous implications,
3. failing to seek the commitment of the patient.

Warning a patient of risks associated with a condition and the patient as to appropriate conduct constitutes treatment as to which a physician must use ordinary care. Schuster v. Altenberg, *supra*. A psychiatrist may be held liable to third parties for failing to warn of the side effects of medication if the side effects were such that a patient should have been cautioned against driving, because it was foreseeable that an accident could result causing harm to the patient or third parties.

A psychotherapist has the duty to warn third parties or to institute proceeding for the detention or commitment of a dangerous individual for the protection of the patient or the public.

Dental Malpractice. For dental malpractice, see Wis JI-Civil 1023.14.

Determination of Future Economic Damages. In a claim based on injury from any treatment or operation performed by, or from any omission by, a person who is a health care provider, the determination of future economic damages must reflect present value, life expectancy, and the effects of inflation. Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(e) states:

(e) Economic damages recovered under ch 655 for bodily injury or death, including any action or proceeding based on contribution or indemnification, shall be determined for the period during which the damages are expected to accrue, taking into account the estimated life expectancy of the person, then reduced to present value, taking into account the effects of inflation.

The Committee interprets this subsection as requiring the jury to make a reduction based on the time value of money and to consider inflation in determining future economic damages. The Committee believes that the statutory language quoted above does not mean that the trial judge should make allowance for present value of money or inflation immediately after the jury has determined economic damages or on motions after verdict.

Medical Negligence Damage Caps. In Ferdon v. Wisc. Patients Compensation Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis.2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440, the court held that the \$350,000 cap (adjusted for inflation) on noneconomic medical malpractice damages set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 655.017 and 893.55(4) violates the equal protection guarantees of the Wisconsin Constitution. Previously, the court had held there is a single cap on noneconomic damages recoverable from health care providers for medical malpractice. Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis.2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866. The amount of the cap is determined by whether the patient survives the malpractice or whether the patient dies. When the patient survives, the cap is contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d). When the patient dies, the cap is contained in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4). In cases where medical malpractice leads to death, the wrongful death cap applies in lieu of - - not in addition to - - the medical malpractice cap. Following Ferdon, the legislature acted to impose a \$750,000 cap on noneconomic damages set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1d)(b).

The court in Ferdon also created an intermediate level of constitutional review that it called “rational basis with teeth, or meaningful rational basis.” However, in Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund, 2018 WI 78, 383 Wis.2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678, the court overruled Ferdon for erroneously invading the province of the legislature and found that rational basis with teeth has no standards for application and created uncertainty under the law. Instead, the court held that rational basis review is appropriate because the cap on noneconomic damages does not deny any fundamental right or implicate any suspect class. When the five-step rational basis scrutiny provided in Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 237 Wis.2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 was applied, the court concluded that “the legislature’s comprehensive plan that guarantees payment while controlling liability for medical malpractice through the use of insurance, contributions to the Fund and a cap on noneconomic damages has a rational basis.” Therefore, the \$750,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions is not facially unconstitutional.” See Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund, 2018 WI 78, 383 Wis.2d 1, 31, 914 N.W.2d 678.

Bystander Recovery Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Based on Misdiagnosis. See the committee commentary to Wis. JI-Civil 1510 and 1511.

Answering Special Verdict Questions; Possibility of Inconsistent Verdicts. In medical negligence cases, allowing the jury to award damages regardless of how it answered negligence and cause verdict questions can lead to inconsistent verdicts under Runjo v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 197 Wis.2d 594, 541 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1995); LaCombe v. Aurora Medical Group, Inc., 2004 WI App 119, 274 Wis.2d 771, 683 N.W.2d 532; Hegarty v. Beauchaine, 2006 WI App 248, 297 Wis.2d 70, 727 N.W.2d 857. In Runjo, the jury was instructed to answer the damage questions only if it affirmatively answered the negligence and cause questions.

Time limitations. A circuit court may dismiss a plaintiff's medical malpractice claim as untimely. See Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a) concerning the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims. See Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(b) concerning the grounds on which the statute of repose bars such claims.

For time limitations concerning claims based on an alleged omission, specifically a misdiagnosis or failure to diagnose, see Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, ¶25, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860. See also Brusa v. Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2007 WI App 166, ¶¶11, 14, 304 Wis. 2d 138, 737 N.W.2d 1, and Winzer v. Hartmann, 2021 WI App 68, 399 Wis.2d 555, 966 N.W.2d 101.